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OCT 11 1950
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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events

1918-1950

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION • INCORPORATED • 22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIX No. 45 SEPTEMBER 29, 1950

Positive U.S. Policy Still Needs Implementation

WASHINGTON—After five years of active participation in world affairs the United States is still groping to define its foreign policy in terms that are thoroughly acceptable to its allies and friends abroad. Secretary of State Dean Acheson illustrated this problem in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 20 when he expressed the hope that "a strong collective security system will make genuine negotiation possible" between the United States and the Soviet Union "and that this will in turn lead to a cooperative peace . . . as tensions begin to ease."

There remains, however, the problem of finding suitable policies for the strengthening of the West's collective security system and the bolstering of individual countries outside the Russian zone of influence. Preoccupation with a search for plans to circumvent Soviet policy has recently put the United States so thoroughly on the defensive in world affairs that it stands in danger of losing the full-hearted support of its friends, who hesitate to mould their policy on this negative forge.

New Emphasis in Foreign Policy

Realization of this dilemma was apparent in Secretary Acheson's address, which in some respects differed in tone from his recent diplomatic statements. Whereas during the Foreign Ministers' conference in New York City a week earlier he had stressed the North Atlantic pact as the shield of American security, on September 20 he said that the United Nations is "now the foundation of our hope." Instead of seeking strength through rearmament alone, he said that "we must keep pushing ahead . . . with our efforts to advance human well-being, . . . carry on with our war against want, even as we arm against aggression." Urging a wider distribution of the ownership of land and improved land use, he recommended that the United Nations "meet the challenge of human misery, of hunger, poverty and disease," with Korea as the starting point. He proposed that the Economic and Social Council "set up a United Nations recovery force," demonstrating "to the people of the world the creative and productive possibilities at the command of the United Nations." The United States has seldom encouraged the use of these possibilities in the past, when programs devised by the Food and Agriculture Organization for combatting land problems and undernourishment were allowed to languish.

The United States, however, continues to develop the main lines of its policy in response to Russian initiative. To surmount the barriers to peace which he said the Soviet Union raises, Secretary Acheson proposed that the General Assembly increase the effectiveness of UN action against aggression by four steps: 1. Provision for calling the Assembly into emergency session on 24 hours notice "if the Security Council is prevented from acting upon a breach of the peace or an act of aggression"; 2. Establishment by the Assembly of a "security patrol, a peace patrol," to observe and report from any area in which international conflict threatens; 3. Creation in the armed forces of each member nation of a United Nations unit to be "continuously maintained in readiness for prompt service on behalf of the United Nations"; 4. Establishment by the Assembly of a committee "to study and report on means which the United Nations might use through collective action—including the use of armed force—to carry out the purposes and principles of the Charter."

It is uncertain whether the large nations friendly to the United States will find the first three proposals any more acceptable than the recommendations for the establishment of a European army including German units which the British and French declined to approve in their conference with Secretary Acheson a few days before the convening of the General Assembly. Adoption of these proposals by the Assembly might bypass the Russian veto, since they would endow the Assembly with authority which the Security Council now monopolizes in questions concerning armed attacks and the establishment of a United Nations armed force.

None of the permanent members of the Security Council, however, has indicated willingness to have questions of aggression dealt with by a two-thirds Assembly vote. The absence of the veto would enable small countries and countries unlikely to take part in any armed conflict to vote for Assembly resolutions which might lead the major powers toward war, whether the latter wished it or not. Not only have Britain and France in Atlantic Pact conversations shown a strong sense of sovereignty regarding the use of their armed forces, but even the United States

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Senate implied as recently as 1949, during debate on the North Atlantic pact, that it favored the retention by the United States of a veto on whether or not it would go to war. In advance of approving the pact the Senate requested assurance from the State Department that the treaty would leave this country free to decide whether or not to fight if one of the allies were attacked. If such freedom was demanded in the North Atlantic area, presumably it would be demanded for the world area.

Congress and Positive Policy

Congress bears considerable responsibility for the negative emphasis in United States foreign policy. Congress is quick to vote large sums for military development; on September 23 it completed action on the bill adding more than $11 billion to the appropriation for the defense agencies and $4 billion for the foreign military assistance program. But it is reluctant to vote funds "to advance human well-being" abroad, as it showed in its temporary opposition last January to the program for economic help to Korea, in the debate earlier this year on the Point Four program for underdeveloped countries and in the small appropriations which it approves for the UN specialized agencies. Concern over Russia and communism impelled the House and Senate to approve on September 23 over the President's veto a bill for controlling subversion in the United States through means which, President Truman said in his veto message, "would help the Communist propagandists throughout the world who are trying to undermine freedom by discrediting as hypocrisy the efforts of the United States on behalf of freedom." The Senate on September 20 inserted in the new military appropriation bill a proposal to bar financial and economic aid to nations shipping to the Soviet Union or states in the Soviet orbit goods that could be useful in time of war. At the request of President Truman, the House deleted the proposal, which could disrupt the commerce of Europe and arouse new demands for American economic assistance. But these tendencies in Congress restrain the Administration from advocating policies more acceptable to our allies than the recent emphasis on attaining strength through arms for the single purpose of frustrating the Soviet Union.

BLAIR BOLLES

UN Nears Decisions on China

The question of who shall represent China is widely considered to be the most important issue before the fifth session of the General Assembly which convened at Flushing Meadow on September 19.

Russian Position

The Russians, since they first walked out of UN organs on January 10 in protest over the continued seating of the Chinese Nationalists, have given first priority to their demand that the Peiping regime be admitted to the UN. Acutely conscious of Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet bloc, the Russians are losing no opportunity to tie Peiping to Moscow. The UN membership question—whether sincerely advanced or not—enables the Kremlin to pose as China's chief advocate while the United States, by continuing to treat the regime on Formosa as the government of China, has drifted into a position which weakens pro-American sentiment not only on the Chinese mainland but also in many other parts of the world.

Although the Chinese and Russians may have conflicting interests regarding such border areas as Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, they have parallel or complementary interests in two areas which are now in the forefront of world attention and which fundamentally affect the recognition question: Formosa and Korea. Peiping, in addition to a natural wish to acquire Formosa, has a fundamental interest in eliminating the Chiang Kai-shek regime which continues with American support to occupy the Chinese seat in the UN. Regarding Korea, both Russia and China have a common interest in preventing an off-shore great power from utilizing this strategically located peninsula as a beachhead for invasion of the mainland—as Japan did during the 50 years from 1895 to 1945. The Russians, by detonating an explosion in Korea, undoubtedly hoped to end Western influence on the peninsula. The prompt UN intervention and the prospect of rapid allied advance northward past the 38th parallel could place American divisions on the borders of China's Manchuria and Russia's Siberia.

Conflicting views regarding American policy toward China have revolved around varying estimates of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. General Douglas MacArthur and some military leaders consider the defense of Formosa essential for American security. General MacArthur's attitude toward the Nationalists has been clearly stated by John Osborne in the September 25 issue of *Life*. Mr. Osborne reports that the General considers the armies of Chiang Kai-shek to be the largest anti-Communist force in Asia, of "high value," and that the United States "should assist, openly and fully, in building them to their maximum strength" in anticipation of their return to the mainland of China.

Other observers, however, see little hope of Chiang's making a comeback, despite reforms belatedly carried out in Formosa and despite reports of widespread disillusionment with the Communists on the continent. Moreover, these analysts consider that the military value of Formosa to the United States has been overrated. Most important, they think that overt hostilities with the Chinese would be disastrous to the United States and the Western cause and might well set off a world conflagration. Consequently they urge withdrawal of support from the Kuomintang and recognition of Peiping. A resolution adopted by the national board of Americans for Democratic Action on September 24, as well as recent columns by Walter Lippmann, give expression to this attitude.

The Truman Administration, caught between these opposed interpretations, has continued to recognize the Nationalists but has at the same time made some conciliatory gestures toward the Communists, beginning with the decision last January not to render active military aid to Formosa. The President's June 27 statement on Korea, at the same time that it placed the strength of the Seventh Fleet behind the defense of Formosa, also called on the Nationalists to suspend air attacks on the mainland and suggested that the island's status might be settled, among other ways, by a decision of the UN. When Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai—whether in response to the American hint or not—appealed the Formosa question to the UN, Washington immediately agreed to place the issue on the agenda. Finally on September 20 in the General Assembly, Secretary of State Dean

Acheson expressed the hope that, pending discussion of the island's status, "all concerned parties will agree to refrain from the use of force."

UN Membership

Similar concessions and veiled hints have characterized American policy regarding recognition and UN membership. Washington's insistence on continued seating of the Nationalist representatives has been accompanied by agreement to various developments which, in the words of Thomas J. Hamilton in the *New York Times* of September 24, indicate a "strong possibility that the Peiping regime will be admitted before the Assembly adjourns." Such a decision would subsequently strengthen the pressures for recognition of Peiping within this country.

The chief reason for this development is the growing sentiment among European countries, as well as in Asia, especially in India, that continuation of the present confused situation is dangerous to world peace. Even France, which has not yet recognized Peiping, has been reported as ready to press for its admission to the UN. The change may be heralded by invitations to the Chinese Communists to participate as an interested party in several debates—notably the discussions of the Formosan question, the alleged American air attacks in Manchuria and the meetings of a special committee authorized by the General Assembly on September 19 which will examine the Chinese representation problem. The United States has several times intimated that it would agree to such participation, the latest occasion being Secretary Acheson's September 20 declaration that, as regards Formosa, "all concerned and interested parties shall have a full opportunity to express their views."

The United States has already expressed its willingness to accept the majority will on the seating of China. Undoubtedly the Truman Administration will attempt to soften the impact of this decision on American public opinion by seeking assurances from Peiping that, in taking a UN seat, it not only undertakes to carry out all obligations of UN membership but accepts all previous decisions of the world body. An effort may also be made to delay final action until the November elections have been held.

Reassurances regarding Formosa and recognition may affect Peiping's decision on intervention in Korea. The establishment of peace in Korea, however, will require not only non-intervention by the Chinese, but also alleviation of Chinese fears which would arise out of maintenance of American troops on the mainland. Secretary Acheson's emphasis in his September 20 address on land reform and UN-sponsored humanitarian aid to Korea goes part of the way to reassure the Chinese. Ultimately, however, the UN decisions regarding the future status of Korea will play a major role in determining whether this strategic peninsula will continue to provide a strong bond tying Peiping to Moscow.

The United States has hesitantly embarked upon a course in the UN which can have great influence in cementing the mutual loyalty of the free nations of the world and will test the extent to which the Chinese Communists are influenced by the Russians. Undoubtedly some critics will find this course the road to disaster, as does *Life* magazine on September 25 when it declares that "Dean Acheson is the symbol of appeasement of communism everywhere in Asia." Others, however, will find this policy the appropriate one to build what Mr. Acheson himself has termed "situations of strength" in the non-Soviet world.

FRED W. RIGGS

Industrial Growth Changes South African Race Pattern

To the outside observer politics rather than economics still seems to dominate the contemporary scene in the Union of South Africa. Beneath the surface, however, economic forces have already begun to produce major political as well as social changes.

Perhaps most striking of the economic realities in South Africa is the manner in which the drift from country districts to the towns during the last decade or so has altered the composition of the urban population. It is a surprise to find, both in the manufacturing city of Port Elizabeth and on the Rand, that the Afrikaner now far outnumbers the English-speaking South African in the ranks—especially the lower ranks—of white industrial workers. Moreover, in the Orange Free State even the Afrikaner who remains on his farm appears to be much less concerned than he used to be with farming as a way of life. The disturbing influence of speculation has affected him no less than his urbanized brother. Nor does this show itself only in the pipe-dream that some day gold may be traced beneath his farm—as it was near Welkom in the northern Free State, where the pitheads are now rising under the influence of a capital investment of a hundred million pounds or more. The search for quick returns is also alleged to be making the Orange Free State farmer more concerned with the ephemeral market value of certain crops than with the ultimate effect of such crops on the land.

Trade Union Attitudes

In the cities trade union leaders frankly recognize the challenge created by the altered character of union membership. The effects appear to vary considerably from union to union. For example, the secretary of one powerful union, of which many Afrikaner women from rural areas have become members in recent years, was emphatic in asserting that loyalty to union principles was replacing the traditional Afrikaner political and cultural "prejudices" which members at first brought with them. On the other hand, vigorous criticism was expressed by even conservative trade unionists on the Rand concerning attempts allegedly being made by the Nationalist party to import politics into the powerful Miners' Union.

Equally interesting were reports from union leaders of the changing attitudes of European workers toward non-Europeans in industry. The over-all impression is that at least a section of the European workers, aided perhaps by a long period of full employment and by an increasing shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers, is coming to feel that its security and continued economic advancement are bound up with security and improved wages and living standards for non-European workers—an increasing number of whom appear to be entering skilled and semi-skilled trades, often by the back door. Side by side with these trade union trends should be noted the increasing insistence of spokesmen for employers, such as Harry Oppenheimer, M.P., on the need to remove present color restrictions in order to improve the efficiency of South African industries, especially those with potential export markets.

Housing Progress

In discussing the position of non-Europeans in industry attention must be given to the vexed question of native housing. Here the dispassionate observer is compelled to record substantial progress as well as to recognize the persistence of a problem of appalling dimensions. In such native locations as Kaya Mandi, in its attractive setting outside Stellenbosch in the western Cape, or at the larger McNamee area in New Brighton in the eastern province, or even on the Rand itself, the investigator who bothers to pass beyond the obviously deplorable conditions of many shanty towns—the existence of which is perhaps over-publicized in the United States and Britain—finds much evidence of positive achievement.

The McNamee housing project, for example, accommodates 25,000 persons—about 80 per cent of the Bantu population of the increasingly industrialized city of Port Elizabeth. Founded 12 years ago, it consists of separate two- and three-room family dwellings. Rents range downward from 22 shillings ($3.08) per month for a three-room house, including electricity, water for small vegetable gardens and free medical services. (The average wage for the male head of the family is £8 to £9 ($22.40 to $25.40) per month.) The McNamee project includes schools run by the Native Affairs Department and nursery schools under the Child Welfare Department where less than four cents a day covers the cost of three meals.

On the Rand, the municipality of Johannesburg, through its native affairs department, holds land within 10 or 12 miles of the center of the city estimated to be sufficient to meet the housing needs of married natives for 10 to 20 years. Conditions in rapidly expanding native townships such as Orlando West are in some respects better than those at McNamee. Even the worst and most dangerous slum areas of Sophiatown and Newsclare have nearby a model subsidized housing settlement for the Colored population where 30,000 live under fairly good conditions. In Johannesburg itself, approximately 27,000 unmarried natives other than mine-workers are housed in well-planned hostels.

This building program has been carried out at a time of great difficulty in the post-war construction industry, which has also been struggling to keep pace with the phenomenal increase in the European as well as the non-European population of South African cities. The need still to be met, however, is enough to disturb the stoutest heart. In March 1950 the shortage of dwellings for Johannesburg's unmarried, urbanized natives was estimated at 16,000 and for married natives at not less than 57,000.

Moreover, it is of actual suffering and hardship, not of administrative amelioration of his lot, that the politically self-conscious, educated African talks to the observer from overseas. It is always dangerous to generalize on the basis of limited evidence, but visits to such institutions as the Bantu university college at Fort Hare, discussions with African as well as European teachers, churchmen and administrators in Natal and the Transvaal as well as in the Cape, and a long interview with the President General of the African (Bantu) National Congress at Thaba 'Nchu, near Bloemfontein, make it difficult to be other than pessimistic as one reflects on the current trend of race relationships within the Union.

FRED ALEXANDER

(This is the second of three articles on South Africa by Professor Fred Alexander of the University of Western Australia who recently spent several months in South Africa.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

POUGHKEEPSIE, October 2, *German-French Relations,* André Philip

LYNN, October 2, *The Future of Germany and American Foreign Policy,* Hajo Holborn

WORCESTER, October 3, *France and the Unity of Europe,* André Philip

PROVIDENCE, October 4, *European Union,* André Philip

EASTON, October 5, *European Union,* André Philip

BETHLEHEM, October 6, *The Situation in France,* André Philip

DETROIT, October 12, *Far East,* Dr. Russell Fifield

HARTFORD, October 13, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

News in the Making

GATHERING STORM IN INDO-CHINA: Indications are accumulating that in late October or November, following the monsoon rains, there will be an all-out struggle for power in Vietnam, where the French-sponsored Bao Dai regime is building up its forces with American aid and the Communist-led Vietminh army is receiving assistance from the Chinese Communists. Recent guerrilla attacks on French border posts are interpreted as preliminary sorties rather than a major drive, but they may be intended to open the frontier for more Chinese aid.

GREEK AID SLASHED: In the first recorded action of its kind, the United States on September 16 announced that an unstated reduction in the amount of Marshall Plan aid allocated to Greece had been agreed upon by the State Department and the Economic Cooperation Administration. According to the State Department, the cut was decided upon because "the rate of progress in the Greek program has not been sufficient to allow complete utilization of the amount originally contemplated."

TAX RISE FOR FRANCE: The increased defense expenditures undertaken and contemplated by the French government have completely upset the proposed fiscal plan for 1951. Recent economic gains had convinced officials that the time was appropriate for a series of tax relief measures. The Korean war, however, has made it necessary for the government to seek revenues for 1951 at least 200 billion francs ($575 million) in excess of this year's total. The increased revenue is expected to come mainly from higher indirect taxes.

BRITISH STEEL: The British Labor government won its test on the nationalization of the iron and steel industry on September 19 when the House of Commons rejected a Conservative motion of censure by a 306-to-300 vote. As a consequence a new general election is not regarded as likely until next spring, even though the Conservatives will continue to seek a government defeat which would allow them to reverse the steel legislation.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIX, No. 45, SEPTEMBER 29, 1950. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMENY, *President;* VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor;* WILLIAM W. WADE, *Associate Editor.* Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.